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M

ilitary and political experts on both sides of the Atlantic assert that the
widening military capabilities gap between the United States and Europe creates a more challenging environment for transatlantic cooperation.
From the American perspective, arguments tend to suggest that the growing
gap limits interoperability, dictates contradictory strategies between the
United States and Europe, generates domestic burden-sharing accusations,
and ultimately obliges the United States to pursue a more unilateralist foreign
and security policy.
On the other hand, from the European perspective, the capabilities
gap may indeed seem to be somewhat irrelevant given today’s perceived lowthreat security environment. Furthermore, to many European governments, the
fiscal constraints required by Europe’s monetary union, coupled with a demographics trend that threatens many of Europe’s social programs, must make the
capabilities gap appear to be insurmountable. Even if the closure of the gap
were desirable, European leaders, as a whole, could hardly seek to make comparable expenditures in defense as the United States without causing a cataclysmic change to Europe’s social and political landscape. And many, either
begrudgingly or not, are at least realizing that the effort required to overcome
this gap is not worth the economic and political costs. The United States commits twice as much national treasure for defense as its NATO European partners and outspends them on a per capita basis of over 3:1. It is simply not
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possible for Europe to readjust spending priorities to make up for this shortfall.
Thus, in all likelihood Europe will remain woefully behind the United States in
terms of absolute military capabilities.
Despite this challenge, European politicians and scholars view the
capabilities gap as a trend whose wider growth can be limited through the implementation of policies that increase defense expenditures on certain key capabilities, and lead to better resource allocation through economies-of-scale
consolidation of the defense industry, research and development, and acquisition agencies, and through mutually advantageous transatlantic defense cooperation in armaments arrangements to access American technologies. These
policies are being implemented not to close the gap per se; rather, they are
being implemented with varying degrees of success to militarily reinforce the
European pillar of NATO while simultaneously providing the European Union
(EU) with a military capability to act autonomously of NATO.
Even with the efforts in these areas, European leaders are nonetheless
seemingly left with a dichotomous challenge: balancing aspirations of increased
military capabilities to buttress its fledgling Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) against the fiscal strains of Europe’s ever more demanding socialwelfare state. This internal struggle suggests a continuation of the status quo and
thus the need for a closer analysis of the significance of the capabilities gap.

The Gap Today
As it exists today, the military capability gap between the United
States and European states certainly limits Europe’s participation in particular
types of operations and as a consequence arguably weakens its decisionmaking
influence within the alliance and its emerging collective voice on the world
stage.1 Still, European allies do have a credible and substantial influence, both
within the alliance and in the global arena:
l Economically, the 454 million inhabitants of the European Union
have a gross domestic product (GDP) of $11 trillion, which is roughly equal
to the 293 million inhabitants of the United States.2
l Militarily, Europeans are in an alliance with the United States, undoubtedly the most militarily capable nation today, wherein each member
theoretically has an equal say. Two of Europe’s members possess strategic
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nuclear forces. Collectively, the Europeans are second only to the United
States in military capabilities, and current military reform efforts under way
in European states, along with NATO and EU initiatives, if implemented effectively, should result in increased efficiencies to further boost capabilities.
l Politically, European states possess two of the five permanent
member seats on the UN Security Council and are vital and influential members in countless international forums. Indeed, Europeans are portrayed as
the alleged masters of “soft power” and are thus perhaps more adept at coping
with today’s asymmetrical threats than the United States.3
In this light, the increasing disparity between American and European military capabilities may not mean much, least of all to a European or,
given Europe’s still significant military capabilities, to any potential military
adversary. In turn, the question many Europeans might reasonably be asking
is, “Does the growing military capabilities gap matter?”
Atlanticists would argue that the gap does matter. Interoperability
with mutually supporting strategies to work in concert with each other is in
Europe’s and the United States’ shared interests. For Europe or the United
States to confront their common threats in isolation invites a more difficult
and dangerous slog at best and catastrophe at worst.4 The United States enjoys
a strong bond with Europe formed over the centuries by a “complex mixture
of shared history, common origins, and an abiding belief in certain principles
like democracy, freedom, and justice.”5 Apart from of the soundness of these
somewhat abstract concepts, past and present governments on both sides of
the Atlantic have recognized that this partnership has served the transatlantic
community well previously and undoubtedly believe it will continue to do so
in the future.6 This conviction manifests itself through the alliance and its
continued evolution. Still, one cannot ignore the conditions that exist today
which cause critics to question the utility of the transatlantic partnership.
Arguably, apart from the political chasm that formed over the war in
Iraq, one of the most critical factors in the debate of NATO’s value to Americans is the perceived power gap between Europe and the United States. The
power gap is the genesis for the alleged divergence within the alliance. It is not
so much the overall state of the transatlantic relationship that needs to be questioned, but rather the underlying assumptions concerning the widening capabilities gap that could lead one to invalidate the need for a strong transatlantic
partnership. Again, over the past decade, current and past US and European administrations, being cognizant of the potential dangers and challenges of a
growing capabilities gap, have sought ways to mitigate the damage of this
trend—primarily through efforts to strengthen the European pillar of NATO,
but also through the implementation of policies that support the EU’s European
Security and Defense Policy.7
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A quick read of the abundant editorials and literature pertaining to
the efforts and policies within NATO and the EU would lead one to believe
that the enterprise of militarily enabling Europe has been a total failure. These
assessments reinforce the perception that Europe has become so shamefully
weak and complacent that the United States is compelled to act as a lone sheriff on the international stage. This perceived state of affairs—that the United
States’ armed forces are no longer interoperable with its European allies; that
the United States and Europe have divergent security strategies; and that,
consequently, the United States is forced to take unilateral measures in global
affairs—is not only the mantra of many political leaders and analysts in the
United States, but is also asserted by some European academics and officials
who want to establish a more credible European military capability either as
part of the deepening process within the EU or to counterpoise the United
States, or a combination of the two.8
In his divisive analysis of American and European relations, Robert
Kagan cites the “power gap” as one of the fundamental reasons that America
and Europe are drifting further apart.9 Unfortunately, by exaggerating trends
while ignoring nuances, Kagan and others paint a rather negative picture of Europeans as being weak and largely unprincipled, as witnessed by their alleged
willingness to cooperate with “evil” regimes for the sake of avoiding violence
at any cost. “Europe” is portrayed as an American antithesis, whose divergence
with its old transatlantic ally is so pronounced, “they agree on little and understand one another less and less.”10 Their argument states that Europeans have
become dependent upon the United States for security and its implied hegemonic and moral leadership. Were this indeed an accurate portrayal, then of
course the capabilities gap would be utterly meaningless, as the Europeans
could bask peacefully under American protection while the United States alone
sets the declination of the world’s moral compass.

The United States of Europe?
One problem with this increasingly accepted portrayal of a powerless Europe is the tendency to regard “Europe” as a fully matured political entity, as though it were the United States of Europe. While the unimaginable
destruction of two debilitating wars has led to a more stable cooperative environment, that hardly makes the region a homogeneous amalgamation of
like-minded states. These states’ histories, cultures, and national psyches
cannot be conveniently lumped into a one-size-fits-all description.11 This
leads to one of the most prevalent problems in debates concerning the power
gap between the states of Europe and the United States. Detractors of Europe
use the term Europe without further elaboration or definition, leaving it to the
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audience to determine precisely what “Europe” means. This loose usage ultimately leads to misleading or false comparisons: from descriptions of national character to defense spending. It ascribes or assumes nation-like
characteristics that are not truly present in a European supranational sense,
such as a “European” foreign or security policy and their implied institutions
such as a “European” ministry of defense or ministry of foreign affairs. There
is no doubt that many European leaders share aspirations for a more unified
Europe and have laid the groundwork for this evolutionary change through
the European Union; yet, those European institutions that represent the genesis of potentially unified European foreign and security policies are in an embryonic state whose further development is uncertain and whose comparison
with similar American institutions is deceptive.12
What, then, is “Europe”? The fact of the matter is that today “Europe” does not really exist other than as a geographical description. The European Union is the closest institutional phenomenon that could represent the
idea of “Europe,” and the two terms are often seemingly synonymous. Assuming that this is a somewhat accurate estimation, then there are a few noteworthy observations that, while being rudimentary, are unfortunately either
ignored or overlooked when describing “Europe.”13
The EU is, after all, made up of several sovereign states, each with its
own foreign policy, defense policy, various ministries, and separate constituencies to whom their respective governments are responsible. The EU exists
through a series of treaties with federal-like competencies only in those areas
where all the member states agree. Thus, while the member states have agreed
to subordinate certain national policies to supranational institutes in the economic community, the development and implementation of foreign and security policies remain largely the purview of each member state.14 Nowhere was
this more evident than during the buildup to the war in Iraq. The crisis was often inaccurately publicized as causing a discord between the United States
and “Europe.” In reality, the polarization of positions among the European
states caused an enormous internal row within Europe (even leading to recriminations of an American plot to split Europe). Indeed, since many European states, at least from the French perspective, “missed a good opportunity
to be quiet” and fall in line with a few of the more “mature” European governments, it was literally impossible to speak of a “European” position on Iraq.
At the EU level, “Europe” was paralyzed, but that did not prevent the participation or support of many European governments in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The crisis merely proved that EU member states retain their sovereignty
in those areas of vital national interest, at least for the time being relegating
Europe’s CFSP to a hodgepodge of separate national priorities limited to
those areas where the member states can reach consensus.
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The nascent “European” foreign or defense policies that exist today
do not represent a solid, well-developed plan to support a “European” supranational strategy, but rather correspond to the lowest common denominator
of 25 separate national policies.15 Accordingly, as this arrangement stands today, the European Union’s CFSP does not necessarily accurately reflect the
foreign and security policies or the priorities of “Europe.” Rather it represents an extension of each state’s own foreign and security policies and strategies. And, when regarding the enormous diversities in foreign and defense
polices of the EU member states, along with the accompanying political and
historical baggage, it is a small wonder the EU has been able to accomplish as
much as it has in the security arena.16
Even the actual differences of military capabilities among the EU
member states are as stark as night and day. Some European nations possess
nuclear weapons, while others are steadfastly opposed to anything remotely
associated with atomic power. Several European governments commit a considerable amount of capital on defense, while others barely spend enough to
have even a token military force. Even among the four EU neutral states, certain members guard their “armed neutrality” with significant capabilities and
healthy armaments industries, while others are comfortable with drastically less capability. The list of differences is virtually endless: from large and
mostly nondeployable legacy conscript forces, to rapidly deployable allvolunteer forces; from states with global military reach through capabilities
such as aircraft carriers, to states without naval or air forces. This exercise of
comparisons and contrasts presents two clear certitudes: it is meaningless to
assign these capabilities a neat “European” label, and it is unmistakably erroneous to characterize these forces as “weak.”
Notwithstanding this diversity of national policies and actual capabilities, the EU member states still aspire to a “deepening” of the EU. Certain
treaties provided the framework for Europeans to develop a Common Foreign
and Security Policy, and within that policy a European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP).17 Within the confines of these policies, member states contribute military capabilities to establish a Headline Goal Force for the conduct of pre-agreed missions. Still, this can hardly be considered a grand
European strategy. Simply because the EU has a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee, and a military staff does not mean that its members have agreed to or even desire a “European Army.” These structures,
institutions, and mission statements again represent nothing more than what
each of the member states is willing to accomplish collectively within the
context of the European Union. The laudatory progress made to date in European security and defense arrangements represents a launching point that can
either remain a tool for accomplishing limited-scope operations under EU
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auspices or the foundation from which more meaningful “European” strategies, policies, and capabilities can grow.
The member states of the European Union can afford such a relatively slow evolutionary implementation of security policies and its associated Headline Force capabilities because NATO remains Europe’s primary
security organization. The development of a military capability autonomous
of NATO is also one that all US administrations have supported as a way of
sharing the security burden and increasing European capabilities. Paradoxically, some critics suggest that either the EU force represents a challenge to
existing security arrangements, or the limited nature of the EU force demonstrates Europe’s military weakness.
On the surface, a force of 60,000 established to take on limited military tasks might seem unimpressive, but the restricted scope of this force
should not be confused with demonstrating a weak European political will or
with Europe confining itself uniquely to the use of this force.18 An EU force
should instead be viewed as a tool that EU member states can employ should
NATO decline to act. Yet critics of Europe’s efforts in this domain fail to see
the forest for the trees as they assess the restricted nature of the force as some
sort of European weakness. To be sure, there are certain critical capabilities or
enablers that European states still need to develop or procure in greater quantities, either under the auspices of NATO’s Reaction Force (NRF) or the EU’s
Headline Goal Force.19 However, there are sound plans and procurement programs at national levels, at bilateral and multilateral levels, at NATO, and at
the EU to assist in correcting these capability shortfalls.
The EU’s narrowly focused efforts in the security arena also are often mistakenly professed as being in competition with NATO or the United
States, when in fact the two organizations complement each other. One
merely needs to take into account the EU’s assumption of policing and peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, its lead in the 2003 Congo crisis, and other
smaller missions around the world to recognize that these institutions mutually support each other’s efforts in advancing stability and security.20
In spite of these considerable achievements and continued undertakings by the EU member states, we are still today some distance from resolving
Secretary Kissinger’s lament of having no one to call to speak to “Europe”
about the most pressing security concerns.21 This condition will likely persist
for some time, precisely because those issues of vital national interest are justifiably closely guarded by each sovereign European state. Whether or not
this somewhat anarchical state of affairs within Europe should be viewed as
positive or negative is beside the point, however. What is important is that one
needs to be cautious when categorizing politics, foreign policies, defense
spending, and even power as “European.” Even though the European states
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are making constant progress toward integration in these areas, all of these
competencies remain today largely at each state’s own discretion and are not
amalgamated at a supranational European level. Along these lines, one can
discuss the various aspects of French, German, or Dutch defense and security
policies with a high degree of authority; however, to attempt to do the same at
a “European” level could prove to be somewhat reckless. Simple descriptions
that do not accurately take into account the peculiarities that make up “project
Europe” invite misunderstandings and grave underestimations of the United
States’ most important and capable allies.

Diverging or Converging Security Interests?
Another concern of the widening capabilities gap is that the power
differences cause the United States and Europe to see the world differently.
According to Kagan, the power gap between the United States and Europe has
provided Europe and America with different outlooks on the world:
When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and
martial glory. Now they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers.
These very different points of view have naturally produced differing strategic
judgments, differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing them, different calculations of interest, and differing perspectives on the
value and meaning of international law and international institutions.22

Yet a straightforward comparison of the European Security Strategy
with the US National Security Strategy quickly leads one to conclude that far
from seeing the world and its threats differently, Europe and America perceive the world in quite similar fashion with its array of common threats.
Even the respective publics agree on the essential themes. The Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations survey of the European and American publics
revealed that they share similar views about the threats they face and how to
cope with them:
Contrary to talk about a growing transatlantic rift, the American and European
publics agree on many fundamental issues. . . . They have common views of
threats and of the distribution of power in the world. Both sides strongly support
a multilateral approach to international problems and the strengthening of multilateral institutions. Majorities on both sides show a strong readiness to use military force for a broad range of purposes, and support NATO and its expansion.23

Of course today’s complicatedly vague threats almost leave one
yearning for the simple days of the Cold War, when a single obvious Soviet
threat left both Europe and the United States with little choice other than cooperation. But despite their ambiguous nature, today’s threats of terrorism,
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rogue or failed states, and weapons of mass destruction are clearly cited in
both Europe’s and the United States’ respective strategies as the primary
threats to security.
The relevance for each of these comparatively vague and asymmetrical threats in determining required strategies and military capabilities is
each distinct, and hence perceived with differing criticalities between allies.
While the United States tends to view these threats with a greater sense of urgency, several European states do not see the immediacy of the threats—a
scenario somewhat reminiscent of times during the Cold War. Yet despite
these differences, the United States and Europe have forged ahead through
NATO to recognize the new threats, develop new strategies, and identify and
implement new programs and capabilities required to cope with them.24 From
both a military and a historical viewpoint, new threats have merely replaced
the old ones.

The Gap and a Division of Labor
Allegations of European capability shortfalls in defense are not new.
There is a long history of American demands for the Europeans to increase
their military capabilities. Continued shortfalls in capabilities accelerated after
the Cold War. European nations cashed in on their “peace dividends” to the
point that many Americans allege an irreparable gap was created, leaving Europe weak and incapable of fighting alongside its American allies. In this
weakened state, the argument goes, European nations have sought the refuge of
international laws, conventions, and organizations to influence world events.
On the surface this observation certainly seems logical: weak nations shun the use of force and embrace international laws and conventions,
while those that are strong prefer to keep the full range of options available to
them for the implementation of foreign and security policies. But the problem
with this view is the underlying assumption that Europe is in fact weak. A
number of indicators are incorporated into this assertion. But most of these
indicators are in relation to or in comparison with the United States. If the
United States is the standard of measurement used in determining what nations are weak or strong, then one could easily assert that every nation other
than the United States is weak.25
Consequently, using the United States as the yardstick to calculate a
state’s absolute military strength is deceptive, especially from a European
perspective. To the contrary, qualitative and quantitative comparisons of military capabilities indicate that Europe is second only to the United States. The
resulting capabilities gap between the two pales in significance when one
considers they are allied with each other, are qualitatively compatible, and
have capabilities that complement the other’s shortfalls.
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Comparing Defense Expenditures
2004
Expenditures
in current
US dollars
($ billions)

Expressed
as a
percentage
of GDP

Percent
of the
world total

Number of
armed forces
(thousands)

United States

455.91

3.9 %

41 %

1,546

NATO Europe

240.11

1.9 %

21 %

2,352

China

84.30

1.5 %

7%

2,255

Russia

61.50

4.4 %

5%

1,027

Japan

45.15

1.0 %

4%

260

1,119.27

2.5 %

100 %

19,970

World Total

Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 2006

Figure 1. Comparing defense expenditures, 2004.

From a quantitative perspective, the United States today commits resources to defense that dwarf the resources committed by any other nation,
and its deployable forces far outnumber Europe’s. Past operations have confirmed the severe challenges Europeans face and an excessive reliance on
American capabilities to effectively deploy their own forces and conduct operations. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the ensuing Global War
on Terrorism have ensured an accelerated divergence of defense budgets well
into the foreseeable future, which may cause one to wonder whether it is not
really a matter of the United States spending too much on defense, rather than
the Europeans spending too little.26
Collectively, Europeans have more men under arms, more main battle
tanks, and more artillery than the United States. They are near parity in fighter
aircraft and attack helicopters. While several European states possess forces
that are made up of nondeployable conscripts and still lack the sought-after
capabilities required for today’s forces to get to the battlefield and then to conduct and sustain combat operations (capabilities including strategic lift; airto-air refueling; precision-guided munitions [PGMs]; sustainment assets; and
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance [C4ISR] systems), quite a few European states possess
precisely those capabilities or have plans to acquire them. European states have
been making headway in many critical areas that should cause one to question
past affirmations of European feebleness. Assumed shortfalls in military airlift
capability continues to be touted as an example of Europe’s inability to get to
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the battlefield, yet a snapshot of lift assets suggests that the shortfall is not
as significant as Europe’s critics would have one believe. European states in
NATO cumulatively possess 681 military airlift platforms to the United States’
819.27 They are making progress in other areas as well, from unpiloted aerial
vehicles (UAVs) and PGMs to the network-centric communications assets required to use them effectively and in concert with their American allies.
However, merely counting dollars spent on defense or the number of
tanks, aircraft, and destroyers does not necessarily provide an accurate picture of the extent of the capability gap. Qualitative considerations are equally
important in appreciating the significance or insignificance of the gap. Qualitative comparisons confirm American dominance of the many cutting-edge
military and dual-use technologies, facilitated by an extremely competitive
and consolidated military industrial base, a leading information technology
sector, and strong government-backed research and development programs.
By definition, this dominance implies a gap of some sort. But even this technology gap is perhaps not as pronounced as some imply. European armies
possess, have access to, or are developing many of the same types of
high-tech equipment and munitions that are employed by the United States.28
The primary difference is that European states do not possess them in quantities comparable to the United States, and the scale of American programs is
often much larger than their European equivalents. From a technological
standpoint, Europe’s defense industries are capable of producing armaments
that are comparable to their American counterparts.29
Another equally important factor in the gap equation is the type of
capabilities required to ensure interoperability, thus enabling US and European forces to fight together. Jeffrey Bialos argues that American and European forces do not necessarily require the same types of capabilities to be
interoperable, but at a minimum they must be able to communicate with each
other via secure modes in order to exchange information. In this area the Europeans are not too far behind, and the cost to invest in C4ISR systems is not
overburdening.30
Consequently, while there is an undeniable numerical gap in capabilities that will invariably continue to grow, these disparities do not necessarily prevent interoperability between American and European forces. If
these disparities in capabilities have caused anything, it is the establishment
of a de facto, albeit unclear, division of labor within the alliance and between
NATO and the EU, wherein the United States plays a leading role during
high-intensity phases of operations and European forces become more prominent in the post-conflict phase. Regardless of concerns that such an arrangement could create resentment and mistrust, that does not change the fact that
this is the essential nature of the alliance today. Heinz Gärtner suggests that in
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Number of Armed Forces in 2006
Active

Reserves

Total

European Union

1,780,598

2,689,579

4,470,177

NATO Europe

2,350,951

3,045,804

5,396,755

Europe Total

2,469,448

3,685,679

6,155,127

United States

1,546,372

956,202

2,502,574

Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 2006

Figure 2. Number of European armed forces, compared to the United States.

order to allay the possible ill feelings and further share risks and responsibilities, the division of labor should be “qualified” and not clear-cut where “Europeans do the peace and the Americans do the war.” With a qualified
division of labor, European states and the United States would maintain capabilities across the security spectrum, but would tend to focus on the missions
where each has a comparative advantage—be it in the collection and distribution of intelligence, the employment of precision munitions, the deployment
of constabulary forces, or simple “boots on the ground.”
This capabilities-driven, qualified division of labor is already being
played out in Afghanistan and the Balkans. In Afghanistan, the United States
led initial combat operations to remove the Taliban and continues to have the
lead role in Operation Enduring Freedom, a Coalition effort with 22 nations
providing capabilities at the higher end of the warfighting continuum. Simultaneously, NATO commands a 36-nation International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) that provides lower-end peacekeeping capabilities.31 We have
seen a similar scenario played out in the Balkans, where the United States initially provided the bulk of the combat power, but not at the exclusion of European combat forces.32 The EU has now taken over NATO missions in Bosnia as
the focus has shifted to those nation-building areas in which the Europeans
have considerable competence. This de facto division of labor grew out of a
military necessity precisely because of the capabilities gap. However, the gap
has not led to a noninteroperable, ineffective alliance; rather, we have seen a
logical migration of capability contributions based on relative strengths and a
partnership that recognizes the comparative advantages each side has to offer.

European Use of Force
Despite the quantitative gaps with the United States, Europeans nevertheless possess a considerable military capability. Furthermore, they are undeniably willing to use it. Critics of European capabilities assert that since
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Europeans are weak, they are horrified by the thought of using military force.33
Yet European states have resorted to the use of force more in the last decade
than in any time during the Cold War, and nearly always in conjunction with
the United States: in Gulf Wars I and II, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Operation
Desert Fox again in Iraq, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, and the Congo.
Europe’s alleged abandonment of power is cited as being due to its preference
for “soft” power, a preference for using forms of persuasion other than the use
of force or the threat of its use.34 Yet, in a speech at Harvard University, the
EU’s High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, recounted an interesting
vignette that challenges the “America as Mars, Europe as Venus” premise.
Just a few weeks ago in the middle of the Indian Ocean a rather daring military
operation took place. A ship was boarded from helicopters on the high seas. It
was carrying missiles from North Korea to Yemen. What happened? The lawyers
in another country got together and decided that the action was illegal and had to
be called off. Who were the people who boarded the ship? They were Europeans,
Spaniards as it happens. Who were those who insisted on the operation being
ended because of international legal norms? The United States government.35

This incident simply demonstrates that bold generalizations do not always reflect reality. In fact, nearly all agree that European states prefer soft power
over hard. But again, as the event above shows, Europe’s preference for soft
power is not at the exclusion of hard power. This is also true of preconceptions about the United States being a warmongering, hegemonic power.
The argument that American military dominance makes the United
States more inclined to use force than its European counterparts is valid in certain circumstances. The availability of unique military capabilities definitely
provides the United States with a greater range of options.36 Certainly this argument could be made for those cases where the United States acted unilaterally:
Grenada, Panama, and cruise missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan and
Sudan. The American capacity to conduct such operations does increase the
probability that the United States will resort to force. Conversely, the probability of Europeans conducting similar operations is reduced, but perhaps not so
much because they do not have the same capabilities, but because of a relative
lack of political consensus. As David Calleo writes, “Europe thus still remains
unable to focus effectively the military power that its states actually possess.”37
In other words, their hesitancy to employ force may not be because the Europeans do not have the military means to engage or even because they lack the political will to engage, but because the immature nature of Europe’s CFSP and
ESDP and the nature of the EU itself do not facilitate such large-scale designs.
In combined combat operations with the United States, regardless of
the capabilities a state brings, the political decision to participate, by definiAutumn 2006
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“The actual differences of military capabilities
among the EU member states are as
stark as night and day.”

tion, demonstrates a certain willingness on the part of European states to resort to force and assists in dispelling the notion that Europeans abstain from
using force. Their relative capability deficiencies vis-à-vis the United States
do not necessarily make European states less inclined to conduct operations
with the United States and, as discussed above, recent history tends to support
this notion.
The conflict in Kosovo confirmed American dominance and is often
cited to point out the disparities in power between Europe and America. European critics take this one step further, suggesting that American willingness
to spend more in order to avoid casualties led to the investments in new technologies that permitted the accurate engagement of targets from safe distances. Accordingly, this development led to a technology gap that has made
the United States more willing to use force than European states. These critics
purport that since European states are unwilling to suffer casualties and allegedly lack these same high-tech capabilities, they therefore would have “to
pay a bigger [human] price for launching any attack at all.”38 Yet, General
Wesley Clark provides firsthand insight that at certain times during the Kosovo crisis, the Europeans were more willing to commit forces than the United
States, despite the possibility of increased casualties.39 The goal of casualty
avoidance is shared by all, but as witnessed in Kosovo and elsewhere, it has
not automatically relegated Europe to the sidelines.

Conclusion
There is an undeniable gap in military capabilities between the United States and Europe, and it seems that it will only grow larger. What, then, is
the significance of this capabilities gap? Have the disparities in accessible
military might caused the members of the alliance to perceive threats differently and their security interests to diverge? Has the gap prevented US and
European forces from being interoperable? Are the differences in power so
pronounced that the United States’ only choice is to go it alone? In a word, no.
It would seem, despite constant and consistent historical warnings to the contrary, the gap in capabilities is somewhat insignificant in some contexts and
exaggerated in others.
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A comparison of the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America with the European Security Strategy confirms that the United States
and the EU share common threats and strategies. Governments on both sides of
the Atlantic recognize that the implementation of the strategies along cooperative lines and through multilateral institutions will be more successful than
each entity following its own strategies in isolation or unilaterally.
The capabilities gap also implies that the United States and Europe
need to continue to work together through the alliance and other cooperative
avenues if they want their forces to remain interoperable to their mutual benefit. As opposed to overcoming inequities in the quantitative gap, restraining a
wider fissure in the technology gap is fiscally feasible and will help to ensure
interoperability. In addition, as European states have already expressed aspirations for a military capability autonomous from NATO, their leaders should
follow through with defense reforms and commit resources in those areas
where there are recognized shortfalls as presented in the EU, in NATO, or
both. Again, the intent of investments in key capabilities is not to close the capabilities gap or to boost spending to what Americans might construe to be
“acceptable levels.” Rather, investments in these capabilities are essential to
further enable European forces, ensuring that NATO member states remain
interoperable and providing EU member states with the capacity to conduct
the full range of missions to which they’ve agreed.
Within NATO and between NATO and the EU, a de facto qualified
division of labor exists. Rather than bemoan this division of labor, leaders
should recognize it and modify strategies and plans accordingly. One could
argue that both organizations are already unofficially on this track, as demonstrated by their flexible metamorphosis in attacking potential or existing security problems around the world, which only a few years ago would have
seemed unimaginable. The Riga NATO Summit scheduled for 28-29 November 2006 offers an excellent opportunity to recognize the particular skill sets
and resources of the member states, reemphasize the requirement to remain
interoperable, and in those areas where there are alliance-wide shortfalls, to
identify candidate capabilities for development as NATO collective assets.
The improbability of many European states committing more of
their treasuries toward defense suggests that capabilities will continue to diverge. While this is certainly not a desirable condition, it is far from being the
apocalyptic end of the alliance. The capabilities gap, while growing, has not
led to a dysfunctional alliance. Rather, Europe’s and America’s leaders continue to acknowledge the enormous value and importance of the transatlantic
partnership in advancing their shared values and facing their common threats.
Despite recent strains in European-American relations, NATO continues to
serve as a valuable organization that binds the allies together, providing the
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vehicle for continued cooperation. In this light, the military capabilities gap
between the United States and Europe, as it exists today, is not as significant
as many observers state or imply.
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